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1. Introduction 
Securitisation is a financial technique that allows a batch of illiquid 
assets to be transformed into a tradable instrument that is liquid and has a 
known flow of income payments. This transformation is made possible by 
using an instrumental entity (a special purpose vehicle or SPV) that is 
separate under the law from the entity with ownership rights to the 
instrument. In consequence, the technique allows banks to transform 
heterogeneous assets that, in the great majority of cases, are not 
negotiable, into securities that are liquid, homogeneous and suitable for sale 
to third parties. The range of assets that can be securitised is very wide and 
includes not only present credit rights (interest from mortgage loans, credit 
card debt, consumer loans for car purchase, bonds, etc.), but also rights to 
future income flows (rights of authorship, property rental income, etc.).  
Asset securitisation has, in recent years, become one of the more 
visible consequences of financial innovation. Since the year 2000, in Europe, 
issues of securitised assets have grown from 78.2 billion euros to 711.1 
billion euros in 2008, which represents an increase in volume by a factor of 
ten in less than a decade2. Although the current financial crisis, in which 
securitisation seems to have played a notable role, produced a halt in the 
commissioning of new securitisation programs during the second half of 
2007 and beginning of 2008, the pressing needs of financial entities for 
liquidity provoked a sharp change of trend after the first quarter of 2008, 
and the volume issued in the latest year increased by almost 60% over that 
of the previous year.  
Over this last decade, Spain has established itself as one of the most 
prolific European countries, second only to the United Kingdom, in the issue 
of securitised banking assets, even though this financial technique is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in this country. In fact, although off-balance 
sheet securitisation appears to have been subject to regulation for the first 
                                                 
2  Data according to the European Securitisation Forum Data Report Q4:2008 (2009). 
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time in 19923, it was not until 1998 that the securitisation of all types of 
assets was permitted, whether or not they had a mortgage guarantee4. 
Despite this notable expansion of the market, there have been few 
empirical studies focusing on the specific characteristics of financial entities 
that lead them to undertake a program of securitisation. In this context, the 
work presented is intended to extend the existing scarce literature; it 
analyses the factors that have encouraged Spanish banks to securitise 
assets, in the period studied, between 2000 and 2007. 
After this introduction, the article is structured as follows: Section 2 
presents a review of the bibliography and identifies the principal factors 
indicated in the literature as determinants in the decision taken by a bank 
to securitise some of its assets. Next, in Section 3, the most common 
structures of securitisation are described, and the situation in the Spanish 
market is analysed. Section 4 presents the sample and methodology 
employed in the empirical research, and the explanatory variables are 
described. The results obtained are set out in Section 5, and in Section 6 
the principal conclusions are presented. Finally, the bibliographical 
references employed are listed in Section 7. 
 
2. Factors determining securitisation, according to previously 
published studies 
One part of the existing literature offers analyses of aspects such as 
the effect that securitisation produces on the risks incurred by the banks 
making use of this technique (Dionne and Harchaoui, 2008; Hänsel and 
Krahnen, 2007), on the quoted prices of the shares of the entities issuing 
securitisation programs (Lockwood, Rutherford and Herrera, 1996; Thomas, 
1999, 2001), and on the supply of bank loans (Hirtle, 2007; Loutskina and 
Strahan, 2006), among others. Other authors, however, have concentrated 
on studying the principal factors that lead a bank to securitise part of its 
portfolio.  
Despite the undoubted growth experienced by the securitisation 
market, currently the specific characteristics of financial entities that lead 
                                                 
3 Law 19/1992, of 7 July, in respect of mortgage securitisation funds and companies, which regulates the 
securitisation of mortgage loans that meet the requirements stipulated in the second section of the Law 
2/1981, of 25 March, for the regulation of the mortgage market. 
4 RD 926/1998, of 14 May, which regulates asset securitisation funds and securitisation fund 
management companies. 
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them to a securitise a proportion of their assets are not clear, although 
previous  studies seem in agreement in identifying three main (but not 
exclusive) groups of motivations:  
 
i. Liquidity or the search for new sources of financing. The liquidity effect 
of securitisation is particularly obvious in cash transactions. Here, the 
transfer of assets follows a true sale (“off-balance sheet”) of the 
underlying portfolio to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV then 
issues notes in order to fund the assets purchased from the originating 
bank. Obviously, this transaction leads to an inflow of cash (funding) and 
hence a possible restructuring of the bank’s Balance Sheet (Gorton and 
Pennacchi, 1995), contingent on the reallocation of cash by the 
originator. The need for liquidity has been stated to be the principal 
determinant factor of securitisation, in recent empirical studies such as 
that of Agostino and Mazzuca (2008).  
ii. Transfer of credit risk. Securitisation allows higher-risk financial 
institutions to originate and fund risky financial assets (e.g. mortgages, 
consumer loans, business loans, etc.) in a way that minimises financial 
distress costs (Gorton and Souleles, 2004). These institutions can use 
SPVs to remove loans from their balance sheet. SPVs are structured to 
remain "bankruptcy remote" from the originating firm, meaning that the 
creditors of the SPV do not have any claim against the originator's 
assets. Moreover, the bonds sold by the SPV are structured to make 
default and bankruptcy all but impossible (although there can be 
defaults on the underlying loans). According to this efficient contracting 
explanation, financial firms facing greater expected financial distress 
costs, for example firms with high leverage and risky assets, are more 
likely to be active securitisers than other firms. Among the recent 
studies that emphasise the importance of this factor in the decision of a 
bank to securitise assets are those of Minton, Sanders and Strahan 
(2004) and Bannier and Hänsel (2008). For these latter authors, 
securitisation transactions are being used mainly as a risk-transfer and 
funding tool that allows a more efficient risk-sharing and liquidity 
transformation.  
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However, it is appropriate to remember on this point that the 
originating entity usually repurchases from the SPV the tranche of worst 
credit quality assets (known as those of first losses, or the equity 
tranche), with the object of securing for the subsequent tranches of the 
structure a sufficient degree of credit improvement, so that these other 
tranches obtain a higher rating and can be placed at lower cost in the 
financial market. This way of proceeding would limit the effective 
transfer of credit risk to the final investors. 
iii. Arbitrage of regulatory capital. In another group of studies, it is argued 
that credit entities have resorted to asset securitisation in order to 
reduce their capital requirements (Ambrose, Lacour-Little and Sanders, 
2005; Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Duffie and Garleanu, 2001; 
Pennacchi, 1988; and Uzun and Webb, 2007, among others). This would 
involve exploiting the possibilities for arbitraging the regulatory capital 
required under the Capital Accord of 1988 (Basel I)5.  
The Basle II Agreement, which entered into force in the majority of 
the countries of the European Union in 2008, corrects some of the 
weaknesses of the Basel I Agreement. Thus, the possible reduction in 
the capital requirements is closely associated with the quality of the 
underlying portfolio and with the amount of risk exposure retained by 
the originating entity, preventing possible arbitrage of capital6. However, 
while the incentives to use regulatory capital arbitrage will shrink under 
the new framework of Basel II that uses risk-sensitive capital ratios, 
arbitraging may have contributed to the increase in securitisation in the 
early years (Minton, Sanders and Strahan, 2004). 
Bannier and Hänsel (2008) have argued against this hypothesis, 
that banks have been arbitraging their regulatory capital, and have even 
written about a significant “reverse” regulatory arbitrage effect: banks 
with low tier 1 capital securitise significantly less than banks with high 
tier 1 capital.  
                                                 
5 In Jones (2000), there is an analysis of the principal techniques used to perform capital arbitraging 
under this Accord (Basel I). Prior to Basel II, the treatment of securitisation from the point of view of the 
regulation of capital was unsatisfactory. Regulation differed in the different jurisdictions, since treatment 
specifically for securitisation had not been foreseen in Basel I and, in general, the regulations were less 
sensitive to risk. As the required capital was the same, the cost of holding low-risk assets is greater 
since the incremental capital is not economically justifiable. In order to save on regulatory capital, banks 
may therefore try to remove low-risk assets from their balance sheets and retain high-risk assets. 
6  For a more detailed analysis of the treatment of securitisation in Basel II, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2004) and Catarineu and Pérez (2008) may be consulted.   
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Apart from the factors indicated, it has been reported that another 
possible cause of the increased banking securitisation is the search for 
improvement in the measures of performance of the entity (ROE, ROA, etc.) 
(Agostino and Mazzuca, 2008); however, in the previous literature, this 
does not appear to be considered a determinant variable, to the same 
extent as the factors previously indicated. It should not be forgotten that 
the downside aspects of securitisation include the fixed costs of setting up 
the SPV, as well as a potential reduction in the tax benefits flowing from 
keeping the assets on balance sheet and financing them with debt. 
Finally, consideration must be given to a series of elements that seem 
to influence the decision of a financial entity to securitise some of its assets. 
Among these are the type of financial entity (commercial bank, savings 
bank, credit cooperative, investment bank, etc.) and its size. With respect 
to the originator type, Minton et al. (2004) state “that the efficient 
contracting hypothesis predicts that commercial banks and savings 
institutions securitize assets to a lesser degree than other institutions, 
because commercial banks and savings institutions do not bear the costs of 
financial distress (the deposit insurer does). In contrast, the regulatory 
arbitrage hypothesis predicts the opposite”. Regarding the size of the 
financial entity, since setting up a securitisation program leads to significant 
fixed costs, we should expect only relatively large banks to securitize their 
loans (Bannier and Hänsel, 2008; Uzun and Webb, 2007). 
With reference to the Spanish market, Martín-Oliver and Saurina 
(2007) conclude that the need for liquidity is the principal and only 
determining factor in the securitisation programs undertaken by the Spanish 
banks, in the period 1999-2006. The cited authors do not find any empirical 
evidence regarding the use of securitisation as a mechanism for the transfer 
of credit risk or as a way of arbitraging regulatory capital. 
The study that is presented here will extend the limited literature 
existing on this topic, and is intended to contribute to it, being the first in 
which separate analyses are made of the various factors guiding Spanish 
financial entities in their decisions to securitise their assets, and those 
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leading to the securitisation of their liabilities7 ; this latter is a phenomenon 
that has its origin in Spain but is currently also found in other countries. 
 
3. Types of securitisation and the Spanish market 
A fairly extensive classification in the markets is that which 
distinguishes, in function of the due date or term of the securities issued, 
between: 
 
i. Programs that issue short-term securities (Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper, or ABCP). Securitisations that issue short term paper are 
programs in which the special securitisation vehicle (SPV) issues 
securities that predominantly have a term of less than one year, 
independently of the nature and the due date of the assets securitised. 
ii. Programs that issue long-term securities. These comprise the major part 
of the market, and they can, in turn, be divided between: 
ii.  Asset-Backed Securities or ABS. These are characterised by the 
portfolio securitised being very fragmented, and comprised of 
assets with a relatively homogeneous risk rating. In the majority 
of the markets, mortgage loans figure prominently among the 
assets backing these ABS securities; this gives rise to the well-
known nomenclatures for the securitised bonds issued in these 
programs, such as: 
- RMBS (Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities) 
- CMBS (Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities).  
Other underlying assets packaged into ABS instruments are loans 
to companies and to the public sector, consumer loans for the 
acquisition of automobiles, and the rights to credit card 
repayments and invoice payments; in the last decade these types 
of asset have increased their presence progressively. 
ii.  Collateralised Debt Obligations or CDOs. These are a more recent 
type of structure, but are acquiring increasing relevance in the 
international market. In this case, the portfolio subject to 
                                                 
7 The securitisation of liabilities could be considered an inappropriate securitisation, although its 
structure is of the traditional type, and it functions in a very similar way to the securitisation of assets. 
The only notable feature is that these liabilities cannot be sold to a fund: a third entity (an investment 
company or similar) is required to intervene, purchasing the liabilities issued by a credit entity and 
selling them  immediately to the SPV. 
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securitisation is not so fragmented, while the assets comprising it 
usually have more heterogeneous risk ratings than in an ABS 
securitisation. In terms of the types of underlying assets used, 
CDOs differ between: 
- Collateralised Bond Obligations (CBOs), for which the 
underlying assets are bonds. 
- Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLOs), for which the 
collateral is constituted by bank loans. 
Moreover, the type of underlying assets may include structured 
products. In such cases, the CDO involves the securitisation of the 
structured products that are themselves derived from already-
existing securitisation structures (CDOs of ABSs). 
According to the purpose of the transaction, another distinction 
possible for CDOs is that between:  
- Balance-sheet CDOs. They enable the originator to 
securitise assets recorded on its balance sheet allowing the 
originator to remove assets, free up regulatory capital, 
manage portfolio credit risk, diversify and reduce financing 
costs. 
- Arbitrage CDOs. They allow the originator to take 
advantage of the positive spread between the average 
yield on the underlying portfolio and the interest rate paid 
on the tranches issued. 
 
Having given an overview of the most common securitisation 
structures (see table 1), the situation of the Spanish market in 2007 is 
described next8:  
- The total volume securitised by Spanish financial entities in 2007 
reached 136.8 billion euros (46% more than the previous year), in 
contrast to barely 8 billion euros securitised in the first years of this 
decade. 
- The securitisation of bank assets accounted for around 80% of the 
securitisation activity in Spain; the largest issuing sector was RMBS 
                                                 
8 Data according to the Report on Banking Supervision in Spain in 2007. Bank of Spain (2008). 
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transactions, which accounted for 46% of total issuance in 2007. The 
securitisation of loans to companies (14.0%) and of credits to SMEs 
(7.5%) were next in importance; as a novelty, in 2007, 13 billion euros 
of interbank loans were securitised. The other types of underlying 
assets, together with the programs of short-term debt securitisation 
(ABCP), had only a residual presence.  
- For their part, securitisations of liabilities in 2007 were carried out 
exclusively on mortgage certificates ("cédulas hipotecarias"), the 
Spanish mortgage-covered bonds, representing close to 20% of the total 
securitised, although these grew at a slower rate than in the preceding 
years. Such securitisation programs are usually classified in the 
international market as CDOs. 
- The great majority of securitisations are of the traditional type; the 
synthetic type of securitisation, in which the credit risk of the portfolio 
securitised is transferred by the contracting of credit derivatives, only 
represents a small minority in Spain. 
- Finally, commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives, 
accounting for 99%, continue being almost the only protagonists of 
securitisation in Spain. 
 
4. Methodological aspects 
4.1. Sample 
The sample employed in the empirical research comprises all the 
Spanish commercial banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives included 
in the Bankscope database during the period 2000-2007 with information 
available for every one of the variables analysed. However, those entities 
that presented abnormal ratios or extreme values (outliers) were eliminated 
from the sample. Once this filtering had been done, the final sample was 
constituted by 408 observations, of which 117 correspond to commercial 
banks, 260 to savings banks and 31 to credit cooperatives. Table 2 gives 
the number of entities that comprise the sample for each of the years 
included in the time horizon.  
The analysis has centred exclusively on those entities authorised by 
the Bank of Spain to capture funds from the public, with a view to 
homogenising the research. However, as stated in the preceding Section, 
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these entities account for almost all the issues in the Spanish securitisation 
market. 
Further, the size of the time horizon considered is sufficient for 
performing a longitudinal analysis, but is not excessively long for significant 
structural changes to have take place. This period also coincides, with a 
substantial expansion of the securitisation activity in Spain, encouraged by 
a change in the regulation that, until almost the end of the 1990's, did not 
allow the securitisation of all types of assets. For that reason the present 
study is focussed on the period from 2000 to 2007 (the latest year available 
in Bankscope at the time the study was carried out).  
Finally, the data on the securitisation activity undertaken by the 
entities considered, in the period of the analysis, have been obtained from 
the documents that the various entities issuing securitisation programs are 
compelled by law to deposit with the Spanish National Securities Market 
Commission (CNMV)9. In table 3 it can be seen that the percentage of 
Spanish banks that securitise has increased considerably in this decade, 
passing from 29.1% in the year 2000 to more than 90% in 2007. By type of 
entity, it is the savings banks that securitise most, as a proportion of total 
numbers: seven out of every ten have undertaken some program in these 
eight years, whereas only half of the commercial banks and credit 
cooperatives have made use of this financial technique.  
 
4.2. Definition of variables 
The principal objective of the present study is to determine what 
factors have been decisive in the development of Spanish banking 
securitisation in the period 2000-2007. For this, a series of specific 
characteristics of the financial entities (explanatory variables) have been 
identified, with the object of capturing the principal motivations among 
those referred to in the literature (see Section 2). 
 
Dependent variable 
                                                 
9 Information obtained from the web page of the CNMV (www.cnmv.es). Data on synthetic securitisation 
are not collected.  
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For each year studied it is determined whether or not a bank in our 
data set has securitised assets. Therefore, the dependent variable can take 
one of two values: 
1, if the financial entity has acted as originator in at least one 
securitisation transaction, 
0, in the contrary case, if there has been no securitisation activity. 
 
Explanatory variables 
Three motivations have regularly been put forward in the previous 
literature as responsible for the securitisation activity of the banks: the 
search of new sources of financing or liquidity; the transfer of credit risk; 
and arbitration of regulatory capital. A fourth group has been added to 
these, which refers to improvement of the performance measures of the 
entity, and a set of control variables. All these variables are in consonance 
with those put forward in similar studies (see table 5). That is, 
 
To securitise or not = f(liquidity, credit risk, regulatory capital, 
performance, control variables) 
 
A) Liquidity (or funding): 
Following the line established in earlier studies, in the present study 
three variables are considered as proxies of the liquidity factor: 
- (1) Interbank Ratio: This is money lent to other banks divided by 
money borrowed from other banks (as percentage). If this ratio is 
greater than 100 then it indicates the bank is net placer rather than a 
borrower of funds in the market place, and therefore more liquid. 
- (2) Net Loans/Deposits & S.T. funding: This liquidity ratio indicates 
the relationship between loans and deposits (as percentage). The 
higher this ratio the less liquid the bank will be. 
- (3) Liquid Assets/Deposits & S.T. funding This is a deposit run off 
ratio and looks at what percentage of customer and short term funds 
could be met if they were withdrawn suddenly, the higher this 
percentage the more liquid the bank is and less vulnerable to a 
classic run on the bank. 
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In theory, one would expect a financial entity to be more predisposed to 
securitise part of its portfolio when the assets of the entity are less liquid. It 
would be precisely this lack of liquidity that would motivate the banks to 
seek new sources of financing in the securitisation market. 
 
B) Credit risk  
The second group of variables is intended to measure the risk profile of 
the financial entity. This will help to test whether the Spanish banks have 
employed securitisation as a way of transferring part of their credit risk. If 
this were the case, the banks with assets of lower quality should show a 
greater securitisation activity.  
Two variables have been chosen for this: 
- (4) Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans: This ratio indicated how much of 
the total portfolio has been provided for but not charged off. It is a 
reserve for losses expressed as percentage of total loans. Given a 
similar charge-off policy the higher the ratio the poorer the quality of 
the loan portfolio will be. 
- (5) Non-performing Loans/Gross Loans: This is a measure of the 
amount of total loans which are doubtful (as percentage). The lower 
this ratio is the better the assets quality. 
 
C) Regulatory Capital Arbitrage 
In relation to the financial entity's regulatory capital, the less this is, 
logically the greater must be the incentive for it to securitise its assets. The 
variables employed to measure the relationship between securitisation and 
the hypothesis of arbitrage of the regulatory capital are: 
- (6) Capital Adequacy Ratio: This ratio is the total capital adequacy 
ratio under the Basle rules. It measures Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital which 
includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves and the 
valuation reserves as a percentage of risk weighted assets and off 
balance sheet risks. This ratio should be at least 8%.  
- (7) Equity/Total Assets: As equity is a cushion against asset 
malfunction, this ratio measures the amount of protection afforded to 
the bank by the equity they invested in it. The higher this figure the 
more protection there is. 
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D) Performance  
On this point a series of relative variables have been identified to 
monitor the effect of efficiency improvement as a motivator of the bank in 
its propensity to securitise: 
- (8) Return On Assets (ROA): This is perhaps the most important 
single ratio in comparing the efficiency and operational performance 
of banks as it looks at the returns generated from the assets financed 
by the bank. 
- (9) Return On Equity (ROE): The return on equity is a measure of the 
return on shareholder funds. Obviously here the higher the figure the 
better but one should be careful in putting too much weight on this 
ratio as it may be at the expense of an over leveraged balance sheet. 
- (10) Cost to Income Ratio (CIR): This is one of the most focused on 
ratios currently and measures the overheads or costs of running the 
bank, the major element of which is normally salaries, as percentage 
of income generated before provisions. 
Previously published studies have not found conclusive results in 
respect of these variables. For Agostino and Mazzuca (2008), a negative 
effect on the financial entity's performance indicators would be expected 
(i.e. the higher its ROA and/or ROE, or the lower its CIR ratio, the lower the 
probability of the entity deciding to securitise loans); thus the need to 
improve the bank's overall financial efficiency or performance is considered 
to be a possible causal factor of banking securitisation. However, for 
Bannier and Hänsel (2008), according to the risk-appetite argument, banks 
with relatively superior performance should be particularly active in loan 
securitisation. 
 
E) Control Variables 
For control purposes, some general characteristics of the originating 
firm have been included in the analysis as additional regressors. First, the 
impact of firm size is analysed; this is measured as the log of its total 
assets ((11) firm size). For this variable, a positive sign is expected due to 
economies of scale following from the fixed costs of setting up a 
securitisation program. 
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Second, a dummy variable is included to identify commercial banks 
and another for savings banks ((12) bank type). With this, it can be 
evaluated if simply the character of the entity influences the decision to 
securitise assets.  
Lastly, year difference effects are controlled for by the inclusion of a 
dummy variable for each year considered in the analysis ((13) year). 
Table 5 brings together the explanatory variables considered in the 
present study, together with their expected sign. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
As first approximation, a univariate analysis of the sample was 
performed; this presents the principal descriptive statistics of the 
explanatory variables and is intended to indicate the main differences 
between the two groups studied. This preliminary study was followed by an 
analysis of the multivariate type, which enables the causal relationship, if 
any, between the probability of securitising and the explanatory variables to 
be isolated. For this analysis a logistic regression model was chosen.  
Logistic regression (also known as the logistic model)10 is a form of 
regression which is used when the dependent variable is dichotomous (in 
this case, to securitise or not) and the independent variables are of any 
type. It is normally employed when the object is to obtain a function that 
would serve to predict whether an observation belongs to a particular 
group, or else when the object is to analyse the influence of a series of 
independent variables on the dependent variable (in our case, the bank’s 
characteristics that may influence its decision to securitise or not). 
The logistic equation is: 
Zi,t = b0 + b1 · Interbank Ratioi,t-1 + b2 · Loans/D&STi,t-1  + b3 · Liquid 
A/D&STi,t-1  +b4 · LL Reserve/Gross L.i,t-1  + b5 · Non-perf. L/Gross Li,t-1  + b6 
· Capital Ratioi,t-1  + b7 · Equity/TAi,t-1 + b8 · ROAi,t-1 + b9 · ROEi,t-1  + b10 · 
CIRi,t-1  + b11 · Sizei,t-1  + b12 · Bank Typei,t + b13 · Yeari,t + εi,t                [1] 
 
                                                 
10 An alternative to logistic regression analysis is probit analysis. These two analyses are very similar to 
one another. While logistic analysis is based on log odds, probit uses the cumulative normal probability 
distribution. Both produce similar results in this case. You can get the probit analysis upon request. 
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Where Zi,t is the log odds of the dependent variable for the ith case in 
the t period, b0 is the constant and the "b" terms are the logistic regression 
coefficients, also called parameter estimates.  
To avoid potential problems of endogeneity, all bank specific variables 
enter the regression equation lagged by one period. 
The relationship between Zi and the probability of securitising (πi) for 
the ith case is described by this link function: 
iZi e−+= 1
1π                                       [2] 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 6 shows a first descriptive analysis of the sample divided into two 
groups: those banks that have undertaken a securitisation program during 
the period studied, on the one hand and on the other, those that have not 
done so (263 against 145). 
The variables selected as indicators of liquidity, (1) Interbank Ratio, 
(2) Net Loans/ Deposits & Short-term funding, and (3) Liquid Assets/ 
Deposits & Short-term funding, move in the direction previously stated as 
expected. The Interbank ratio is lower in banks that securitise assets 
(133.05% against 136.18%); this would indicate that the financial entity 
resorting to securitisation is a net borrower of funds in the interbank market 
and is therefore seeking to improve its financial position. Also, the mean 
percentage of loans relative to deposits and other short term financing is 
97.67% for banks that securitise compared with 75.96% for those that do 
not. Similarly, the mean percentage that the liquid assets represent over 
short-term bank financing is 14.87% for entities that securitise, against 
23.84% for the others. All those variables seem to indicate that, on 
average, the banks that resort to securitisation present lower liquidity that 
those that do not securitise. 
For the ratios employed to measure the bank's credit risk, (4) Loan 
Loss Reserve/Gross Loans, and (5) Non-performing Loans/Gross Loans, the 
results obtained are different. While the former is slightly higher in financial 
entities that securitise assets (2.00% against 1.95%), the results obtained 
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for the ratio of Non-performing Loans/Gross Loans do not match the 
expected (0.95% for banks that securitise compared with 1.04% for those 
that do not). Thus, one would expect that this last ratio would be higher in 
banks that develop securitisation programs; this would mean that 
securitisation is used as a way to transfer credit risk. The subsequent 
analyses will confirm whether this variable has statistical significance. 
The univariate analysis also shows that those banks that make use of 
securitisation present, on average, lower capital ratios than those that do 
not do so (11.64% against 12.82%). However, in both cases, these are 
significantly higher than the minimum 8% required by the Basel capital 
agreements. Also the percentage that the equity represents over the total 
assets is, on average, lower in the entities that have chosen to securitise 
assets. 
With respect to the variables selected to measure banking efficiency or 
performance, all three (ROA, ROE and CIR) present worse mean results in 
the group of banks that securitise. This could indicate that some financial 
entities have decided to resort to securitisation as a way to improve their 
ratios of performance. 
Finally, the mean size of the banks that securitise, measured as the log 
of its total assets, is only slightly lower than that of those banks that do not 
do so (15.58 against 15.71), although, the statistical range is very high in 
both cases.  
The next stage was to complete this preliminary analysis with a study 
of the variance (ANOVA), with the objective of testing whether the 
differences found in the mean values of the variables analysed, between 
those banks that securitise and those that do not, are statistically 
significant11. 
The result from applying the analysis of variance to the sample of 
banks (see table 7) is that, at the univariate level, four of the variables 
considered show a behaviour in those financial entities that have 
                                                 
11 The basis of ANOVA is the partitioning of sums of squares into between-group and within-group. 
These calculations are used via the Fisher statistic (F) to analyse the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis 
states that there are no differences between means of different groups, suggesting that the variance of 
the within-group samples should be identical to that of the between-group samples (resulting in no 
between-group discrimination capability). 
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undertaken a securitisation program that is significantly different from those 
that have not done so. Those four variables are: 
- (2) Net Loans/Deposits & Short-term funding 
- (3) Liquid Assets/Deposits & Short-term funding 
- (6) Capital Adequacy Ratio 
- (10) Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) 
In summary, at the univariate level, significant differences seem to 
exist in the mean levels of liquidity (variables (2) and (3)), regulatory 
capital (variable (6)) and banking efficiency (variable (10)) between the 
banks that securitise and those that do not. The financial entities that 
securitise present, on average, lower liquidity, lower capital ratios, and 
lower performance. 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis  
Having carried out the initial univariate analysis, the next stage was to 
apply a logistic regression model; first, however, an analysis of 
multicolinearity between the independent variables previously selected was 
performed. A study of the matrix of correlations indicates that the 
coefficients of bivariate correlation are all close to zero, except for those 
between ratio (8) ROA and the variables (7) Equity/Total Assets and (9) 
ROE. This dependence was subsequently confirmed by the analysis of 
multicolinearity performed. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of the 
variables indicated is close to 10 for all of them, and in the case of the ROA 
ratio reaches a value of 14.46212. As a result, this ratio has been eliminated 
from the analysis, leading to a substantial improvement of all the VIFs of 
the independent variables, whose values are now below 2 and, in the 
majority of cases, close to 113.  
Once the multicolinearity had been dealt with, the logistic model could 
then be determined. Table 8 reflects the results of the application of the 
logistic regression to the sample of banks (model 1). Of the set of variables 
                                                 
12 The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) measures the impact of collinearity among the variables in a 
regression model. VIF shows us how much the variance of the coefficient estimate is being inflated by 
multicollinearity. The square root of the VIF tells you how much larger the standard error is, compared 
with what it would be if that variable were uncorrelated with the other X variables in the equation. A 
commonly given rule of thumb is that VIFs of 10 or higher (or equivalently, tolerances of .10 or less) are 
often regarded as indicating multicollinearity, but in weaker models values above 2.5 may be a cause for 
concern. 
13 This absence of multicolinearity was corroborated by the analysis of the Index of Condition. 
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considered in the study, five14 (two ratios of bank’s liquidity, one ratio of 
performance, size, and bank type) present statistical significance15: 
− (1) Interbank Ratio 
− (2) Net Loans/Deposits & Short-term funding 
− (10) Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) 
− (11) Size 
− (12) Bank Type 
The sign of the coefficients16 confirms the expectations. Thus, one 
would expect a greater likelihood of securitisation by a bank, the lower is 
the Interbank ratio or the greater the proportion of the entity's loans that 
are financed with deposits and other short-term debt (less liquidity). On the 
other hand, a high Cost to Income ratio could motivate the bank to 
securitise part of its portfolio of assets with the object of improving its 
profitability. 
The Exp(b)17 of the (10) CIR variable is equal to 1.119; it can thus be 
stated that, when this ratio increases by one unit, the odds that a bank will 
opt to securitise increase by a factor of 1.119, when other variables are 
controlled. This leads to a new conclusion: of the three ratios with statistical 
significance, it is the CIR ratio that appears to exert the most influence on 
the probability that a bank will securitise. 
On the other hand, the fact that the financial entity is a savings bank 
seems to have a positive influence on the probability the entity will opt to 
securitise assets. This is a result that would be expected from confirming 
that 70% of the Spanish savings banks undertook securitisation programs 
in the period studied, against only 50% of commercial banks and credit 
                                                 
14 Statistical significance was also found for the years included in the analysis as dummy variables. 
15 The Wald statistic is an alternative test which is commonly used to test the significance of individual 
logistic regression coefficients for each independent variable (that is, to test the null hypothesis in 
logistic regression that a particular logit (effect) coefficient is zero).  
16 As is well known, parameter estimates (b coefficients) associated with explanatory variables are 
estimators of the change in the logit caused by a unit change in the independent variable. The b 
coefficients vary between plus and minus infinity, with 0 indicating that the given explanatory variable 
does not affect the logit (that is, it makes no difference to the probability of securitising); positive or 
negative b coefficients indicate that the explanatory variable increases or decreases the logit of the 
dependent variable.  
17 Exp(b) is the odds ratio. The odds ratio is the natural log base, e, to the exponent, b, where b = the 
parameter estimate. For continuous variables, the odds ratio represents the factor by which the odds 
(event) change for a one-unit change in the variable. An Exp(b)>1 means the independent variable 
increases the logit and therefore increases odds (event). If Exp(b) = 1.0, the independent variable has 
no effect. If Exp(b) is less than 1.0, then the independent variable decreases the logit and decreases 
odds (event).  
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cooperatives. Also, the logistic model seems to indicate that large banks are 
more disposed to securitise than the smaller ones. 
In relation to the use of securitisation as a mechanism for the transfer 
of credit risk, this factor is not relevant for the period considered. This could 
be because the Spanish banks have been retaining an increasingly larger 
share of the risks associated with securitisation (the "originate-to-hold" as 
opposed to the "originate-to-distribute" model of securitisation).  
Finally, the hypothesis of arbitrage in regulatory capital is not 
confirmed by the logistic model. 
 
5.3. Results according to the characteristics of the underlying 
portfolio 
As was reported in Section 3, most of the securitisation programs 
undertaken in Spain have mortgage loans as underlying assets, with the 
securitisation of other assets such as commercial loans or consumer credits 
accounting for a much smaller proportion of the total. In any case, the 
portfolios securitised consist of large numbers of assets of relatively low 
individual value, and with similar risk profiles (ABS-transactions).  
However, a significant percentage of the total securitisation carried out 
in Spain (approximately 20% of the total) is accounted for by the 
securitisation of liabilities issued by credit entities. The great majority of 
these involve mortgage certificates or bonds18, although operations have 
also been carried out with subordinated debt and treasury bonds. In a high 
percentage of cases, these involve structures of the CDO type. By definition, 
the securitisation of liabilities cannot have the object of transmission of 
rights and risks associated with the assets; therefore one would expect that 
the transfer of credit risk would not constitute a determining motivation in 
this type of transaction, in contrast it could be expected for ABS-
transactions. 
To check the validity of this starting hypothesis, the original sample 
has been broken down into two non-exclusive subgroups, with object of 
studying if there are differences in the behaviour of the financial entities 
                                                 
18 These are covered bonds issued by Spanish financial institutions and collateralised by mortgage loans. 
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depending on the type of securitisation program undertaken (of assets 
versus liabilities).  
The results obtained from the application of the logistic regression 
model to the two types of securitisation indicated are given in table 9 
(models 2 and 3). 
Although the objectives of greater liquidity (ratio (2) Loans/Deposits & 
ST debt), and improvement of performance (ratio (10) CIR) remain as 
confirmed determining factors when securitising assets, in the case of the 
securitisation of liabilities, the principal and indeed sole motivation appears 
to be the search for an improved liquidity (ratios (1) Interbank Ratio and 
(2) Loans/Deposits & ST debt). 
In reality, the securitisation of liabilities constitutes an alternative way 
of placing these liabilities on the market. The reason for this is that 
securitisation, by means of the subordination of the securities issued (the 
tranche structure), can obtain the maximum credit rating (AAA) for almost 
the whole of the issue, bettering in many cases the credit rating of the 
originating credit entity itself. 
The transfer of credit risk remains as an irrelevant factor for explaining 
the undertaking of securitisation programs by the Spanish banks. None of 
the variables used to measure the bank’s credit risk show statistical 
significance in both types of programs. While this would be the expected 
result in the securitisation of liabilities by means of CDO-type structures, 
not necessarily have to be so in the case of securitisation of assets (ABS-
transactions). This would suggest again that Spanish banks have opted for 
an “originate-to-hold” as opposed to the “originate-to-distribute” model of 
securitisation. 
Besides, the hypothesis of arbitrage in the regulatory capital is not 
confirmed in either model, which seems to discount definitively the notion 
that securitisation may have been employed by the Spanish banks as a way 
of arbitraging regulatory capital. 
Finally, the type of financial entity is shown to be relevant when a 
securitisation program is undertaken; the savings banks have a greater 
propensity than the commercial banks to opt for the securitisation of 
liabilities.  
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5.4 Analyses of robustness 
Several analyses have been carried out to assess the robustness of the 
results obtained. 
Firstly, with respect to the variables employed as regressors, the 
previous models (models 2 and 3) have been re-estimated with the object 
of testing again those hypotheses for which statistical significance has not 
been found. For this, the Non-performing Loans/Gross Loans ratio has been 
replaced by the Loan Loss Provisions/Net Interest Income ratio as proxy for 
the measurement of credit risk of the financial entities (models 4 and 5). 
This latter ratio has been employed previously by authors such as Bannier 
and Hänsel (2008) and measures the relationship between the provisions in 
the profit and loss account and the interest income over the same period. 
Ideally this ratio should be as low as possible, and in a well-run bank, if the 
lending book presents higher risk, this should be reflected by higher interest 
margins. In the same way, the Tier 1 ratio has been employed in place of 
the capital ratio as a proxy variable to analyse the possible utilisation of 
securitisation as a mechanism for arbitraging regulatory capital (models 6 
and 7). This ratio has frequently been employed in previously published 
studies to measure the relationship between securitisation and the 
hypothesis of arbitration of regulatory capital (for example, by Agostino and 
Mazzuca, 2008; Bannier and Hänsel, 2008 and Calomiris and Mason, 2004, 
among others). This ratio is shareholder funds plus perpetual non-
cumulative preference shares as a percentage of risk-weighted assets and 
off-balance sheet risks measured under the Basle rules, and it should be at 
least 4%. In both cases, the results do not differ from those obtained 
previously, thus again confirming the irrelevance of the two hypotheses that 
the transfer of credit risk and the arbitrage of regulatory capital are factors 
in the securitisation activity of Spanish banks (see Table 10). 
Secondly, the method used to select variables has been modified, 
utilising a forward conditional stepwise method (models 8 and 9). The 
forward stepwise logistic regression method determines automatically which 
variables to add from the model, starting with the constant-only model and 
adding variables one at a time until reaching the step at which all variables 
not in the model have a significance, in this case, higher than 0.05. In 
comparison with the previous models, the most striking difference occurs in 
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the variables that determine the ABS-type securitisation, where the ratio 
(7) Equity/Total Assets appears with statistical significance, although with a 
sign different from that which would be expected (see model 8). According 
to this, the more solvent financial entities would be more inclined to 
securitise their assets. This "reverse" regulatory arbitrage effect has also 
been observed by Bannier and Hänsel (2008) in the European market.  
Finally, a third test of robustness has carried been out in respect of the 
method of estimation used in the analysis. Since panel data are involved, 
the model can be estimated with fixed or random effects. Fixed effects 
models assume that the unobserved variables differ between banks but are 
constant over time for the same bank. In fact, this effect has been 
introduced in the analysis by establishing a set of dummy variables for time. 
However, it could be that certain unobserved characteristics of the financial 
entities differ over time and may be relevant for explaining the undertaking 
of securitisation programs by these financial entities. In this case, we can 
control for this possibility by employing random effects. Again, the results 
after using a random effects logistic regression model (models 10 and 11) 
do not differ from those obtained previously with the base models; they 
coincide both in the explanatory variables and in their sign, although some 
loss of statistical significance is noted (see Table 10).  
 
6. Conclusions 
Securitisation is a financial operation by means of which a financial 
entity transforms a non-negotiable asset, or right to payment/income flow, 
into a fixed-income instrument that is homogeneous, standardised and, 
consequently, can be traded on organised securities markets. Since the year 
2000, securitisation programs in Europe have multiplied in volume 
exponentially, growing from 78.2 billion euros to 711.1 billion euros in 
2008. Spain is the second largest securitisation market in Europe, in terms 
of volumes issued. 
The object of the present work is to learn more about what has 
motivated Spanish financial entities to carry out programs of securitisation, 
and thus to meet a need for empirical findings to contribute to the limited 
existing literature. In addition, with respect to earlier studies, this research 
study has explored differences between the financial entities that securitise 
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assets and those that securitise liabilities, which is an aspect scarcely 
touched in the previous literature. 
The results obtained confirm the hypotheses that liquidity and the 
search for improvements in efficiency are the determining factors that have 
motivated Spanish banks to undertake securitisation programs in the period 
2000-2007. The hypotheses of transfer of credit risk and arbitrage in 
regulatory capital are not confirmed by the logistic regression model. 
A more detailed analysis, differentiating between programs of asset 
and liability securitisation, reveals that the objective of seeking new sources 
of financing is a key factor in both types of structure. In fact, Spanish banks 
have employed the securitisation of liabilities in the period analysed only for 
funding, without any of the other variables analysed having played any role 
in this case. The securitisation of liabilities by means of CDO-type structures 
is utilised, generally, by savings banks of medium size that are able to 
group together indirectly their credits in a common fund, and can in this 
way reach the minimum volumes necessary to participate in these markets. 
The use of the securitisation as a mechanism in the search for liquidity 
and, therefore, as a source of additional financing, has been seen to 
increase from the beginning of the current financial crisis in August 2007, 
although in a way different from how it has been used up to now. Thus, it 
can be seen that increasingly there are more entities that underwrite their 
own securitisation programs in order to use them as a guarantee for 
obtaining resources in the auctions of the European Bank Central (ECB). 
Similarly, securitised bonds are being utilised by some financial entities to 
obtain liquidity through the Financial Assets Acquisition Fund (FAAF), 
created in 2008 by the Spanish government with the object of generating 
the liquidity necessary so that the banks might continue lending to the 
private residential property sector. Both practices have partially replaced 
the issue of debt, or the interbank market itself, as sources of finance to 
enable the banks to grant loans. 
In relation to the use of securitisation as a mechanism for the transfer 
of credit risk, this factor is not relevant in the ABS programs for the period 
considered. This is because, unlike what is happening in other financial 
systems, and particularly in the USA, the Spanish banks have been 
retaining an increasingly larger share of the risks associated with 
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securitisation (the "originate-to-hold" as opposed to the "originate-to-
distribute" model of securitisation). Thus, since the Circular 4/2004 of the 
Bank of Spain came into force in 2005, a regulation which tightened the 
criteria for permitting securitised assets to be eliminated from the balance 
sheets of the financial entities, and which stipulated that, for this to be 
done, there should be a substantial transfer of all the risks and profits 
associated with the securitised assets, the volume of operations in which 
the assets have been taken off-balance sheet has been relatively small. 
On the other hand, the results obtained in this study suggest that the 
role played by the performance improvement variables in motivating 
programs of asset securitisation cannot be ignored. The Spanish financial 
entities have sought to use asset securitisation as a means of improving 
their efficiency ratios. 
Finally, although the normative development of Basel II in Spain, 
culminating with the entry into force in June 2008 of Circular 3/2008 of the 
Bank of Spain, imposes a much more restrictive treatment for financial 
entities attempting to reduce their capital requirements by using 
securitisation programs, it does not seem likely that this will affect the 
future development of the market; our study has found that this variable 
has not been a key factor in the past. 
The results obtained for the Spanish market coincide, in general, with 
those reported by the previous studies. Bannier and Hänsel (2008) find that 
a European bank is more likely to securitise, the higher the bank’s credit 
risk exposure, the lower its liquidity and the worse its performance 
measures. However, for Agostino and Mazzuca (2008) and Martin-Oliver 
and Saurina (2007), in the Italian and Spanish markets respectively, the 
only motivation found to be a determining factor in securitisation is the 
search for new sources of bank financing. 
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Table 1: Types of Securitisation 
 
According to the term of the 
securities issued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the characteristics of the underlying 
portfolio: 
 
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS)  
(backed by portfolios of homogenous assets comprising 
exposures to a large number of obligors) 
 
Based on the underlying asset: 
- Residencial Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) 
- Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS). 
- Other ABS (auto, credit card, leases, loans, 
receivables, and other)  
 
Long term  
 
 
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
(backed by heterogeneous exposures to a limited number of 
names) 
Based on the underlying asset: 
- Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)  
- Collateralized bond obligations (CBOs)  
- Structured finance CDOs (such as CDOs of ABS). 
 
According to the aim of the transaction: 
- Balance-sheet CDOs. 
- Arbitrage CDOs. 
Short term Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) 
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Table 2: Composition of the sample. 
 
                 Year 
Bank Type 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 TOTAL 
Commercial Banks 16 13 15 12 14 18 16 13 117 
Savings Banks 37 36 31 32 31 36 33 24 260 
Credit Cooperatives 2 4 4 3 5 6 6 1 31 
TOTAL 55 53 50 47 50 60 56 39 408 
 
 
Table 3: Number (and percentage) of entities comprising the sample that have securitised assets. 
 
                 Year 
Bank Type 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 TOTAL 
Commercial Banks 7 
(43.8%) 
6 
(46.2%) 
7 
(46.7%) 
5 
(41.7%) 
8 
(57.1%) 
8 
(44.4%) 
12 
(75.0%) 
11 
(84.6%) 
64 
(54.7%) 
Savings Banks 8 
(21.6%) 
16 
(44.4%) 
20 
(64.5%) 
26 
(81.3%) 
27 
(87.1%) 
32 
(88.9%) 
30 
(90.9%) 
23 
(95.8%) 
182 
(70.0%) 
Credit Cooperatives 1 
(50.0%) 
1 
(25.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(66.7%) 
3 
(60.0%) 
4 
(66.7%) 
5 
(83.3%) 
1 
(100.0%) 
17 
(54.8%) 
TOTAL 16 
(29.1%) 
23 
(43.4%) 
27 
(54.0%) 
33 
(70.2%) 
38 
(76.0%) 
44 
(73.3%) 
47 
(85.5%) 
35 
(92.1%) 
263 
(64.5%) 
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Table 4: Bank-specific variables used in previous studies (in chronological order). 
 
 Sample Database 
Model 
used 
Bank-specifics variables 
Liquidity or funding Credit Risk 
Equity or Regulatory 
Capital 
Others 
characteristics 
(performance, 
cost…) 
Control Variables 
Calomiris and 
Mason (2004) 
USA banks 
(1996) 
Faulkner and 
Gray´s Card 
Industry 
Directory / 
Nilson Report 
Univariate / 
OLS 
regression/ 
Probit / 
Tobit 
- Cash and government 
securities/ on-
balance-sheet assets 
- Total loans greater 
than 90 days past 
due or in nonaccrual 
status/total assets  
- Standard deviation 
of total loans 
greater than 90 
days past due or in 
nonaccrual 
status/total assets 
- Insured 
deposits/total 
deposits 
 
- Tier 1 and 2 
capital/managed 
assets 
- Tier 1 and 2 
capital/on-
balance-sheet 
assets 
- Growth of tier 1 
and 2 capital 
over past year 
(log difference) 
No No 
Minton, Sanders 
and Strahan 
(2004) 
USA financial 
companies 
with publicly 
traded stock 
(1993-2002) 
Compustat / 
Securities Data 
Corporation 
Univariate / 
Probit / 
Tobit 
No - Asset Risk (firm’s 
stock return 
volatility) 
- Firm’s debt rating 
(dummy) 
- Leverage (Capital-
Asset Ratio) 
No - Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
- Issuer’s tax 
payments 
- Size (market 
capitalization) 
- Originator Type 
(dummy) 
Martín-Oliver 
and Saurina 
(2007) 
Spanish banks 
(1999-2006) 
Bank of Spain / 
Spanish Nacional 
Securities Market 
Commission 
Probit / 
Tobit 
- Credit Growth (high, 
medium and low) 
(dummy) 
- Loan/Deposits 
- Interbank (relative 
weight of the 
interbank liabilities) 
- Non-performing 
Loan Ratio 
- Non-performing 
Mortgage Ratio 
- Concentration of the 
Loan Portfolio 
(Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index) 
- Solvency Ratio 
(quotient 
between capital 
and risk weighted 
assets) 
- Average cost of 
liabilities 
- Size (log of its total 
assets) 
- Weight of the 
mortgage portfolio 
- Bank Type 
(dummy) 
- Year (dummy) 
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Uzun and Webb 
(2007) 
USA banks 
(2001-2005) 
Call Reports 
Univariate / 
Logistic 
Regression 
No No - Total equity 
capital 
- Tier 1 capital 
- Total risk-based 
capital ratio 
- Tier 1 leverage 
ratio 
No - Size 
- Leverage (Loan 
Ratio) 
- Grow 
Agostino and 
Mazzuca (2008) 
Italian banks 
(1999-2006) 
Bankscope / 
Talete Creative 
Finance 
Probit 
- Interbank Ratio 
- Net Loans/ Total 
Assets 
- Liquid Assets / Dep & 
ST Funding 
- Historical Cost 
- Leverage (Total 
Assets/ Total Equity) 
- Market Instruments 
Funding Ratio 
- Listing in Financial 
Markets (dummy) 
No - Tier 1 Ratio 
- Total Capital 
Ratio 
- Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
- Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
- Net fees and 
Commissions 
Ratio 
- Interest bearing 
assets Ratio 
- Size 
- Number of 
securitisations in 
previous years 
- Year (dummy) 
Bannier and 
Hänsel (2008) 
European 
banks (1997-
2004) 
Bankscope / 
Quarterly CDO 
Deal List by 
Standard and 
Poor’s / 
European 
Securitization 
Deal List by 
Computershare 
Fixed Income 
Services Limited 
Univariate / 
Logit 
- Liquidity (money lent 
to other banks / 
money borrowed from 
other banks) 
- Low liquidity 
(decentile of banks 
with lowest liquidity) 
(dummy) 
- Low liquidity * 
liquidity 
- Risk (Credit Risk 
Provision/ Net 
Interest Income) 
- High risk (decentile 
of banks with 
highest risk) 
(dummy) 
- High risk * risk  
- High risk * low tier 
1 (dummy, stock-
listed firms only) 
- Quality (gross 
interest income / 
gross outstanding 
accounts) 
- Tier 1 Ratio 
- Low Tier 1 
(decentile of 
banks with lowest 
tier 1 capital) 
(dummy) 
- Low tier 1 * tier 1 
- Equity share 
(equity / total 
assets) 
- Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
- Cost-Income 
Ratio (CIR) 
- Low performance 
(decentile of 
banks with 
highest CIR) 
(dummy) 
- Low performance 
* CIR  
- Tax 
- Size (log of its total 
assets) 
- Business Variable  
- Year (dummy) 
- Country(dummy) 
- Bank Type 
(dummy) 
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Table 5: Explanatory variables employed in the analysis. 
 
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign 
A) Liquidity (or funding)   
(1) Interbank Ratio (-) 
(2) Net Loans/Deposits & S.T. funding (+) 
(3) Liquid Assets/Deposits & S.T. funding (-) 
  
B) Credit Risk  
(4) Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans (+) 
(5) Non-performing Loans/Gross Loans (+) 
  
C) Capital Regulatory  
(6) Capital Adequacy Ratio (-) 
(7) Equity/Total Assets (-) 
  
D) Performance  
(8) Return On Assets (ROA) (+/-) 
(9) Return On Equity (ROE) (+/-) 
(10) Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) (+/-) 
  
E) Others  
(11) Firm size (+) 
(12) Bank Type (dummy) --- 
(13) Year (dummy) --- 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 
 
N Range 
5% 
percentile 
95% 
percentile 
Median 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation   Statistic Std. Error 
NOT SECURITISE (1) INTERBANK RATIO 145 983.89 3.74 532.05 76.26 136.18 14.64 176.27 
 (2) LOANS/D & ST 145 160.20 3.25 114.96 81.19 75.96 2.66 32.00 
 (3) LIQUID A./D & ST 145 94.12 1.65 63.64 21.80 23.84 1.49 17.95 
 (4) LL RESERVE/GROSS L. 145 3.89 0.45 3.50 1.89 1.95 0.06 0.78 
 (5) NON-PERF. L. /GROSS L. 145 2.73 0.24 2.24 0.89 1.04 0.05 0.58 
 (6) CAPITAL RATIO 145 28.70 8.23 21.34 12.10 12.82 0.37 4.40 
 (7) EQUITY/ T.A. 145 22.58 2.44 11.83 7.45 7.68 0.29 3.54 
 (8) ROA 145 4.80 0.23 1.86 0.88 0.92 0.05 0.64 
 (9) ROE 145 29.32 4.44 20.47 12.82 12.92 0.40 4.78 
 (10) CIR 145 83.36 23.38 75.47 57.39 55.82 1.20 14.43 
 (11) SIZE (LN Assets) 145 11.09 13.70 18.29 15.61 15.71 0.13 1.56 
SECURITISE (1) INTERBANK RATIO 263 815.03 8.14 525.03 86.98 133.05 9.24 149.89 
 (2) LOANS/D & ST 263 161.35 64.77 135.59 96.27 97.67 1.40 22.69 
 (3) LIQUID A./D & ST 263 58.83 2.05 36.39 12.74 14.87 0.71 11.48 
 (4) LL RESERVE/GROSS L. 263 3.63 1.48 2.84 1.94 2.00 0.03 0.41 
 (5) NON-PERF. L. /GROSS L. 263 3.38 0.37 1.99 0.83 0.95 0.03 0.52 
 (6) CAPITAL RATIO 263 13.90 9.10 14.20 11.60 11.64 0.10 1.67 
 (7) EQUITY/ T.A. 263 20.55 4.93 10.54 7.15 7.57 0.13 2.10 
 (8) ROA 263 3.40 0.52 1.55 0.84 0.86 0.02 0.37 
 (9) ROE 263 28.57 6.86 18.67 11.48 12.22 0.25 3.98 
 (10) CIR 263 64.59 42.22 69.92 58.69 57.94 0.51 8.26 
 (11) SIZE (LN Assets) 263 12.84 9.51 18.61 15.98 15.58 0.15 2.42 
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Table 7: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). 
 
Variables   Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Squares F Sig. 
(1) INTERBANK RATIO Between Groups 913.839 1 913.839 0.036 0.850 
Within Groups 1.036E+07 406 25517.957   
Total 1.036E+07 407    
(2) LOANS/D & ST Between Groups 44034.845 1 44034.845 63.322 0.000*** 
Within Groups 282335.483 406 695.408   
Total 326370.328 407    
(3) LIQUID A./D & ST Between Groups 7513.045 1 7513.045 37.668 0.000*** 
Within Groups 80978.505 406 199.454   
Total 88491.550 407    
(4) LL RESERVE/GROSS L. Between Groups .288 1 0.288 0.884 0.348 
Within Groups 132.498 406 0.326   
Total 132.786 407    
(5) NON-PERF. L. /GROSS 
L. 
Between Groups .766 1 0.766 2.615 0.107 
Within Groups 118.872 406 0.293   
Total 119.638 407    
(6) CAPITAL RATIO Between Groups 130.839 1 130.839 15.102 0.000*** 
Within Groups 3517.553 406 8.664   
Total 3648.393 407    
(7) EQUITY/ T.A. Between Groups 1.072 1 1.072 0.147 0.702 
Within Groups 2961.978 406 7.296   
Total 2963.050 407    
(8) ROA Between Groups 0.398 1 0.398 1.690 0.194 
Within Groups 95.478 406 0.235   
Total 95.876 407    
(9) ROE Between Groups 45.667 1 45.667 2.493 0.115 
Within Groups 7438.296 406 18.321   
Total 7483.963 407    
(10) CIR Between Groups 421.492 1 421.492 3.576 0.059* 
Within Groups 47850.961 406 117.860   
Total 48272.453 407    
(11) SIZE (LN Assets) Between Groups 1.586 1 1.586 0.343 0.559 
Within Groups 1879.959 406 4.630   
Total 1881.545 407    
*** Significance at the 1%-level. 
** Significance at the 5%-level. 
* Significance at the 10%-level. 
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Table 8: Determinants of asset securitisation for Spanish Banks (2000-
2007). 
 
 
Model 1 
Variables b 
Std. 
Error 
Wald Exp(b) 
(1) INTERBANK RATIO -0.002** 0.001 5.354 0.998 
(2) LOANS/D & ST 0.049*** 0.010 22.798 1.050 
(3) LIQUID A./D & ST 0.014 0.016 0.794 1.014 
(4) LL RESERVE/GROSS L. 0.263 0.292 0.809 1.301 
(5) NON-PERF. L. /GROSS L. -0.519 0.320 2.628 0.595 
(6) CAPITAL RATIO -0.002 0.063 0.001 0.998 
(7) EQUITY/ T.A. -0.052 0.062 0.712 0.949 
(9) ROE 0.113 0.047 5.783 1.120 
(10) CIR 0.112*** 0.019 33.425 1.119 
(11) SIZE (LN Assets) 0.330*** 0.122 7.326 1.391 
(12a) COMMERCIAL B. -0.058 0.602 0.009 0.944 
(12b) SAVING B. 0.904* 0.519 3.036 2.469 
Constant -12.674*** 2.717 21.752 0.000 
Year dummy Yes 
N securitise (N not securitise) 263 (145) 
Log likelihood -357.046 
Likelihood ratio χ2 173.942*** 
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.477 
Notes: The dependent variable equals one if a financial entity completes a securitisation 
transaction and zero otherwise. *** Significance at the 1%-level. ** Significance at the 5%-
level. * Significance at the 10%-level. 
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Table 9: Determinants of asset securitisation according to the characteristics of the 
underlying portfolio (2000-2007) 
 
 
Model 21  
(ABS) 
Model 32  
(Liabilities CDO) 
Variables b Exp(b) b Exp(b) 
(1) INTERBANK RATIO 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.999 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.997 
(2) LOANS/D & ST 
0.037*** 
(0.008) 
1.038 
0.036*** 
(0.010) 
1.036 
(3) LIQUID A./D & ST 
0.003 
(0.015) 
1.003 
0.015 
(0.022) 
1.015 
(4) LL RESERVE/GROSS L. 
0.209 
(0.291) 
1.232 
0.178 
(0.406) 
1.195 
(5) NON-PERF. L. /GROSS L. 
-0.461 
(0.294) 
0.631 
-0.128 
(0.407) 
0.880 
(6) CAPITAL RATIO 
0.014 
(0.057) 
1.015 
-0.053 
(0.087) 
0.948 
(7) EQUITY/ T.A. 
-0.073 
(0.060) 
0.929 
0.033 
(0.080) 
1.034 
(9) ROE 
0.062 
(0.043) 
1.064 
0.131 
(0.050) 
1.140 
(10) CIR 
0.076*** 
(0.017) 
1.079 
0.040 
(0.022) 
1.041 
(11) SIZE (LN Assets) 
0.458*** 
(0.110) 
1.581 
-0.544*** 
(0.157) 
0.580 
(12a) COMMERCIAL B. 
-0.450 
(0.540) 
0.637 
1.322 
(1.184) 
3.750 
(12b) SAVING B. 
-1.158** 
(0.460) 
0.314 
5.119*** 
(1.130) 
167.243 
Constant 
-9.164*** 
(2.241) 
0.000 
-6.353* 
(3.301) 
0.002 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
N securitise (N not securitise) 185 (223) 150 (258) 
Log likelihood -433.670 -285.675 
Likelihood ratio χ2 128.394*** 251.001*** 
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.361 0.628 
Notes: 1The dependent variable equals one if a financial entity completes an ABS-transaction and zero 
otherwise. 2The dependent variable equals one if a financial entity completes a Liabilities CDO-
transaction (mainly CDO of cédulas hipotecarias) and zero otherwise. The Standard Error is reported 
in parentheses. *** Significance at the 1%-level. ** Significance at the 5%-level. * Significance at 
the 10%-level. 
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Table 10: Analyses of robustness. 
 ABS1 Liabilities CDO2 
Variables Model 43 Model 64 Model 85 Model 106 Model 53 Model 74 Model 95 Model 116 
(1) INTERBANK RATIO 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
--- 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
(2) LOANS/D & ST 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.039*** 
(0.006) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.040*** 
(0.010) 
0.036*** 
(0.010) 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
0.046*** 
(0.017) 
(3) LIQUID A./D & ST 
0.003 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
--- 
0.012 
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.022) 
0.013 
(0.022) 
--- 
0.017 
(0.022) 
(4) LL RESERVE/GROSS L. 
-0.300 
(0.264) 
0.089 
(0.297) 
--- 
-0.259 
(0.268) 
0.332 
(0.361) 
0.196 
(0.419) 
--- 
0.143 
(0.387) 
(5) NON-PERF. L. /GROSS L. --- 
-0.512 
(0.295) 
--- 
-0.491 
(0.294) 
--- 
-0.109 
(0.406) 
--- 
-0.118 
(0.403) 
(5) LOAN L. PROV. /NET INT. INC. 
0.062 
(0.022) 
--- --- --- 
-0.060 
(0.029) 
--- --- --- 
(6) CAPITAL RATIO 
0.037 
(0.055) 
--- --- 
0.037 
(0.054) 
-0.073 
(0.089) 
--- --- 
-0.102 
(0.105) 
(6) TIER 1 --- 
-0.107 
(0.065) 
--- --- --- 
-0.019 
(0.081) 
--- --- 
(7) EQUITY/ T.A. 
-0.056 
(0.060) 
0.007 
(0.067) 
-0.091** 
(0.045) 
-0.068 
(0.059) 
0.034 
(0.080) 
0.024 
(0.091) 
--- 
0.074 
(0.088) 
(9) ROE 
0.087 
(0.044) 
0.057 
(0.043) 
--- 
0.148 
(0.043) 
0.125 
(0.051) 
0.133 
(0.050) 
--- 
0.012 
(0.051) 
(10) CIR 
0.076*** 
(0.017) 
0.069*** 
(0.017) 
0.049*** 
(0.012) 
0.075** 
(0.017) 
0.045 
(0.021) 
0.040 
(0.022) 
--- 
0.023 
(0.021) 
(11) SIZE (LN Assets) 
0.412*** 
(0.111) 
0.395*** 
(0.115) 
--- 
0.418*** 
(0.110) 
-0.467** 
(0.161) 
-0.543*** 
(0.167) 
--- 
-0.496*** 
(0.192) 
(12a) COMMERCIAL B. 
-0.575 
(0.543) 
-0.582 
(0.547) 
0.967*** 
(0.269) 
-0.393 
(0.541) 
1.367 
(1.178) 
1.346 
(1.183) 
--- 
1.311 
(1.181) 
(12b) SAVING B. 
-1.229*** 
(0.465) 
-1.247*** 
(0.463) 
--- 
-1.192** 
(0.464) 
5.211*** 
(1.113) 
5.086*** 
(1.130) 
3.569*** 
(0.399) 
5.249*** 
(1.129) 
Constant 
-8.914*** 
(2.262) 
-7.118*** 
(2.343) 
-6.100*** 
(1.114) 
-9.810*** 
(2.104) 
-6.776** 
(3.248) 
-6.830** 
(3.360) 
-4.391*** 
(0.773) 
-6.950** 
(3.007) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N securitise (N not securitise) 185 (223) 150 (258) 
Log likelihood -428.178 -430.762 -490.430 -429.600 -281.307 -286.008 -314.711 -283.918 
Likelihood ratio χ2 133.886*** 131.301*** 71.634*** 132.464*** 255.369*** 250.669*** 221.965*** 252.758*** 
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.374 0.368 0.215 0.371 0.636 0.627 0.574 0.631 
Notes: 1The dependent variable equals one if a financial entity completes an ABS-transaction and zero otherwise. 2The dependent variable equals one if a financial entity 
completes a Liabilities CDO-transaction (mainly CDOs of cédulas hipotecarias) and zero otherwise. 3Models 4 and 5 include the Loan Loss Provisions/Net Interest Income 
ratio, in place of the Non-performing Loans/Gross Loans ratio. The rest of the variables remain the same. 4Models 6 and 7 consider the Tier 1 ratio in place of the Capital 
ratio. The rest of the variables remain the same. 5Models 8 and 9 employ a forward conditional stepwise method for the selection of variables. 6Models 10 and 11 have been 
estimated using a random effects logistic regression model. The Standard Error is reported in parentheses. *** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
